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Abstract 
Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their 
existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because 
of the complexity of contracts and informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-
firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate 
their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time 
invariant preferences of firms across banks and can be attributed to the existence of 
switching costs. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old 
borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the 
switching costs. The discount is about 44 basis points, equal to 7 per cent of the average 
interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification 
drawbacks.  
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A buyer faces switching costs if an investment specific to her current seller must be 
duplicated for a new seller. This creates economies of scope among repeated purchases 
from the same supplier (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). Switching costs have far reaching 
consequences on the standard competitive market equilibrium because they modify entry 
conditions as well as incumbent pricing strategies. In the case of banking sector switching 
costs are also relevant from a macroeconomic point of view. They may reduce price 
elasticity in retail markets so that the transmission of policy rate changes to retail rate 
dynamics may exhibit some form of sluggishness because banks may not find it profitable 
to adjust their prices frequently (European Central Bank, 2009). 
Several arguments suggest that switching costs might be relevant in credit markets. 
First, there are transaction costs of closing the accounts with the current lender and 
opening new ones with another bank. Second, there exist learning costs such as costs of 
switching to a new bank following specific rules and practices in its lending activity after 
learning different rules adopted by the old lender. Third and more importantly, switching 
costs are also related to the investment in setting up a close tie with a bank (Boot, 2000). 
Changing the lender may imply the loss of a number of relationship-based benefits such as 
intertemporal smoothing, increased credit availability, enhancement of borrower’s project 
payoffs, and more efficient decisions in case of financial distress.  
In this paper we study switching costs in business local credit markets, by focusing 
on a specific kind of switching behavior that is the change of a firms’ main bank. We focus 
on the main bank because multiple bank financing is a widespread phenomenon, even in 
the case of rather small firms (Detragiache et al., 2000) and, in this case, it not obvious 
how to define a switching episode. However, as indicated by Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Elsas, Heinemann and Tyrell (2004) multiple banking often 
coexists with the presence of one bank with a pivotal role, whose presence will reduce 
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coordination costs of the other arm’s-length lenders while the latter help mitigating the 
hold up problem generated by the privileged position enjoyed by the main (and more 
informed) bank. As a consequence also multiple bank firms are likely to face switching 
costs when they change their main bank, because at least the relationship lending-based 
investment is to be duplicated.  
We analyze switching costs with two empirical exercises. First, we investigate their 
existence with a test that follows directly from the definition of switching costs: if they 
characterize the demand side, then choosing a specific banking partner today reduces the 
utility from selecting a different main lender tomorrow. Through a standard revealed 
preferences argument it is possible to show that this is equivalent to say that firms’ choices 
across lenders are persistent over time. However, persistence in lending relationships could 
also be generated by unobserved time invariant bank-firm matches (the so called spurious 
state dependence). To take account of this, we propose a mixed logit model through which 
it is possible to measure true persistence in lending relationships by simultaneously 
controlling for time invariant preferences of borrowers across lenders. Using very detailed 
data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we find that firms changing their 
main lender incur significant switching costs. As far as we know, the assessment of 
switching costs through a mixed logit model aimed at detecting true inertia in buyer-seller 
relationships is new in the context of credit markets.
2 
Second, we test whether banks price discriminate between old and new borrowers 
offering more favorable conditions to the latter. In fact this is a generally agreed prediction 
in the Industrial Organization literature that analyzes pricing strategies in industries with 
heterogeneous switching costs and customer recognition (Chen 1997, Taylor 2003). Our 
empirical findings, mainly based on an interest rate equation, show that banks actually lure 
borrowers attached to competing main lenders with attractive entry-level offers. In our 
preferred specification, switching premium amounts to 44 basis points. This “paying 
customer to switch” evidence is robust to a number of controls including those for 
selectivity and firm-level omitted variables. Moreover teasing interest rates are also found 
in the case of multiple bank firms switching to an already known new main bank.  





found in Farrell and Klemperer (2007). However, there are still few empirical contributions 
explicitly referred to the analysis of switching costs in business lending markets. Kim, 
Klinger and Vale (2003) infer the existence of switching costs and assess their magnitude 
in Norwegian credit markets by analyzing aggregate market share and interest rate 
dynamics. Gopalan, Udell and Yerramilli (2007) investigate motivations for firm switching 
to a new bank by using micro data. They find that firms decide to change their previous 
banking partner mainly to obtain higher loan amounts and hence to overcome borrowing 
constraints at their existing bank.  
Another recent line of research analyzes whether switchers are offered a discount or 
alternatively pay a premium on the interest rates offered. Within the theory of insider vs. 
outsider lending (Sharpe, 1990) and using data drawn from the 1998 Survey of Small 
Business Finance, Black (2006) finds that outsider rates tend to be higher than insider 
rates.
3 Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) reach an opposite result: in their data on loans 
extended by Bolivian banks a firm borrowing from an outside bank is charged an interest 
rate that is more than 50 basis points lower than that charged on a comparable loan from its 
current inside banks.
4  
We contribute to these streams of literature in several ways. First, disentangling 
switching costs from unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the correlation over time of 
bank-firm matches has important consequences on the understanding of credit market 
dynamics. Consider, for example, a bank that makes a transitory loan interest rate cut. If 
the true model of firm behavior is characterized by unobserved heterogeneity and 
switching costs are absent, the price cut will give rise to a transitory market share increase 
for that bank. In presence of switching costs, however, the same strategy will generate a 
non-transitory increase in the number of attached borrowers and this, in turn, modifies 
dynamic pricing strategies, as our evidence on teasing interest rates shows. Second, our 
findings shed also a new light on the nature of bank-firm relationships in the Italian credit 
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market. The existence of a “paying customer to switch” strategy even in the case of firms 
selecting a new main lender with which they already had a lending relationship in the past 
points to the fact that the main lender plays a special role among the firm’s creditors. 
Notably, this holds true even in the case of the Italian credit markets where the 
fragmentation of credit supply is high and resorting to multiple lending is very common. 
Finally, our joint evidence on the true persistence in lending relationships and on teasing 
rates gives some clues on how to disentangle between alternative models of banking 
competition. While models based on Betrand competition can explain the existence of 
poaching strategies, they come to terms when they have to explain true persistence in 
bank-firm relationships. On the other hand, adverse selection models can easily explain 
borrowers’ lock-in but but are unable to justify the discounts offered to the firms switching 
to an already known bank. Models with heterogeneous switching costs and customer 
recognition can easily accommodate the two pieces of evidence.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly recall 
theoretical contributions dealing with credit markets with switching costs. Section 3 
describes the data. Our main results are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.  
2. Theoretical background 
In credit markets banks deliver their services directly to customers and hence they 
are able to know whether a given borrower is one of its current clients and price 
discriminate on the basis of this knowledge. Moreover, switching costs are likely to be 
heterogeneous across firms: for instance switching is expected to be costlier for a small and 
opaque single-bank firm with a well established relationship with a bank than for a large 
firm with multiple lenders and characterized by a large amount of hard information. In the 
Industrial Organization literature the models that best fit these two features are those 
analyzing markets with heterogeneous switching costs and customer recognition (Chen, 
1997; Taylor, 2003). One general conclusion of this literature is that in equilibrium firms 
offer discounts to their competitors’ customers and that clients with “low” switching costs 
(below a certain threshold) change their supplier.  
Beyond customer recognition and switching cost heterogeneity, credit markets 





investment projects and therefore in their ability to repay debt obligations. Moreover, there 
exist relevant asymmetries of information both between lenders and borrowers and, on the 
supply side, between informed and uninformed banks (Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004).  
Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) is one of the few attempts to adapt switching cost 
models with customer recognition to the case of business credit markets. The authors 
assume that there exist only short term loan contracts and that a firm resorts to credit in 
each period.
5 An unattached borrower can freely choose across alternative competing 
banks. Once it made its choice, the existence of switching costs affects the current choice 
in the sense that the firm receives a higher payoff if it chooses again the same lender it 
elicited in the past. Under this respect, switching costs produce the effect of establishing a 
causal link between past and current choices. As it will become clearer in Section 4, we 
will exploit this fact in order to identify the presence of switching costs in credit markets 
by using data on individual borrower credit histories.  
The model has two periods. At the beginning of the first period all borrowers are 
unattached. At the end of the same time span, each borrowing firm chooses a specific 
banking partner (let us call it Inside bank or bank I). In the second period
6, the borrower 
wants to finance a new investment project requiring one unit of capital and returning q > 1 
at the end of the period with probability  and 0 in the case of failure occurring with 
probability 1 - . Bank I will offer the unit of capital and require an interest rate equal to RI 
on this sum; an outside bank (henceforth bank O) can also offer a loan contract to the 
attached borrower charging an interest rate equal to RO. Banks will be paid back only in the 
case of a successful investment project, otherwise will receive nothing. Borrowers bear 
switching costs equal to s when moving from I to O. These costs are assumed to vary 
randomly across borrowers according to a uniform distribution defined on the [0; s ] 
interval. It is also assumed that borrowers are not aware of their idiosyncratic switching 
costs until period 2. An attached borrower will compare the two loan contracts and decide 
to switch whenever  s R q R q O I     ) ( ) (   . This inequality implicitly defines a 
threshold level s* =  (RI – RO) such that bank I’s customers with switching costs below it 
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will switch to bank O while those with s > s* will stay with bank I. Within this set-up, the 
authors confirm the predictions on the existence of teasing rates: in equilibrium the outside 
bank will finance part of borrowers’ switching costs by charging interest rates that are 
lower than those set by bank I. Namely, they will pay borrowers to switch. Moreover the 
discount offered to rivals’ attached borrowers will increase with the intensity of switching 
costs measured by s .  
The authors also assume that there will be a proportion of borrowers whose 
investment projects will fail with certainty (i.e. with  = 0). In the second period, Bank I 
will be able to identify those borrowers with certainty and react by not renewing credit to 
them. The latter will switch to the bank O that in turn will be unable to identify those bad 
borrowers from the pool of switching firms (adverse selection). It can be shown that 
market equilibrium remains the same as that described above if the proportion of bad 
borrowers is under a given threshold.  
This particular strategy aimed at introducing adverse selection enormously 
simplifies the model. However, a deeper integration between adverse selection and 
switching costs within a unified setting is a challenging task.
7 Rather than following that 
line of research, here we will investigate weather the evidence presented in Section 4 can 
be explained by resorting either to switching costs or to adverse selection as they were two 
separate theories on the working of credit markets.  
3. Data 
Our main data source is the quarterly Survey on lending rates carried out by the 
Bank of Italy since 2004 and including about 300 Italian banks. The sample is 
representative of credit markets at local (provincial) level. Information is available at firm-
bank level and for each record matched, revocable and term loans and the interest rates 
charged on these operations are reported. Data also include several borrower characteristics 
like sector of economic activity, legal form and the municipality where the firm is located.  
We merge this data set with additional information on bank characteristics taken 
from the Bank of Italy supervisory reports displaying branch locations and loans broken 
down by area and sector of economic activity. We restrict our analysis to business lending. 
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Borrowers reporting bad loans are dropped from the sample as we want to exclude 
switching episodes that are due to a firm pathological condition. Data at our disposal refer 
to bank-firm relationships at two dates (March 2004 and March 2005, throughout the paper 
we refer to them as t – 1 and t, respectively). Firms that were not present in both dates were 
also excluded from the sample. The latter choice has two advantages. First, it enables us to 
address a threshold effect: the Survey on lending rates, in fact, only includes loans above 
75.000 euros; accordingly, a specific borrower can enter or exit the sample due to reasons 
we could not control for. Second, the presence of a firm at the two dates is required 
because of the kind of switching event we are examining, i. e. one based on the possibility 
that the same firm might change a bank partner within that time span (see more on this 
below). 
Our empirical strategy is also influenced by the need to keep the computational 
burden associated to the estimation of a mixed logit model (see equation 2 below) within 
reasonable limits. This also explains why the analysis is restricted to two dates. Besides, 
the time span between t and t - 1 corresponding to a one year period in our data seems to be 
appropriate to analyze the switching event. Computational reasons also induce us to restrict 
our sample to lending relationships between one of the top 15 banks operating in a 
province and the borrowers located in the same area. In fact, the mixed logit model 
requires a fairly limited number of alternatives in the choice set to be empirically 
manageable.
8  
At last, the analysis is focused on four local provincial markets: Turin, Bologna, 
Rome and Naples considered as separated entities. Again, computational reasons related to 
the mixed logit model estimation prevented us from increasing the number of bank-firm 
matches beyond a certain limit. But this aspect in our data is hardly a problem for the 
analysis as the number of observations is huge in each market. Furthermore, spatial 
segmentation is usually associated to credit markets in the light of the limited geographical 
scope of many lending relationships (see Petersen and Rajan, 2002, for the US and 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005, for the Belgian loan market).
9 The four selected provinces 
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9 Kim, Klinger and Vale (2003)’s paper lacks this local dimension as they consider the Norwegian loan 





exhibit sharp differences in terms of per capita income levels, sectoral specialization, 
quality of the local institutions, size and concentration of the loan market (see Table 2). 
This huge heterogeneity serves as a check that the validity of our main findings extends 
across local environments showing different structural characteristics.
10  
The final sample includes about 79,000 bank-firm relationships and 50,000 
borrowers. Table 1 contains a detailed description of the variables included in our sample 
while Table 3 shows summary statistics.  
In the literature on switching costs it is usually assumed that a customer obtains its 
service or product from a single supplier. Consequently the switching event can be defined 
as the change in the identity of this unique supplier between the two periods. In credit 
markets however firms usually borrow from more than one bank thereby making the 
definition of the switching event more complex. For instance, a single-bank firm in t – 1 
could start getting credit from a new bank in t without breaking its pre-existing 
relationship. To address this problem in this paper a switching occurrence is defined as the 
change between t – 1 and t of the firm’s main bank, i.e. the bank granting the highest loan 
amount. This choice is motivated by the special role played by the main creditor. In our 
data set those lenders cover on average 87 per cent of total bank credit extended to each 
firm. Even considering exclusively firms borrowing from more than one bank, this 
percentage amounts to 67 per cent of a firm bank debt. Thus, given this strong 
concentration, it is likely that a relationship with the main bank will generate stronger 
benefits for the borrower and, consequently, increases its lock-in.
11  
Notably, our definition of the switching event encompasses both the switch toward 
a main bank in t who was a not a creditor of the firm in t - 1 and the case in which the new 
main lender is chosen among the set of those banks granting credit in t - 1. In the latter 
circumstance, the firm would not necessarily incur in the costs related to initiating a new 
bank-firm relationship (for instance think about the contractual costs generated by opening 
a new account and by the need to learn the new rules). Even in this case however, it is 
likely that there will be positive switching costs motivated by the special role played by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
sample according to bank size (measured by the number of branches). This is hardly a solution as far as small 
banks are concerned because they are assumed to compete in the same national market.  
10 In this respect, it is worth noting that investigating how switching costs may vary according to differences 
in local credit markets is not a goal of our analysis. 
11 Elsas (2005) empirically shows that banks are more likely to be Hausbanks when their share of borrower 





main creditor and hence by the need for the firm to further investing into the relationship to 
adapt to the changed identity of the new main bank. For instance, the substitution of the 
main lender could involve the need for the firm to increase the frequency of the contacts 
with the new main bank’s loan officers to better know each other and to establish new 
formal and informal rules to follow in the future transactions and that fit better with the 
new role of that bank. We will come back to this issue in the empirical section. 
4. Methodology and results 
4.1. State dependence in bank-firm relationships 
In order to assess the existence of switching costs we look at inertia in bank-firm 
relationships. A genuine causal effect between past and present choices made by firms 
when selecting their main lender would signal the presence of switching costs. However 
identifying such an effect is a challenging task as there exist two possible explanations for 
a positive correlation between repeated choices (Heckman, 1981). On the one hand, 
borrowing from a bank in the past alters current debtor preferences (so called “true state 
dependence”) but, on the other hand, choices over time may be correlated solely because of 
temporally persistent unobservable factors influencing both the current and the past choice 
(“spurious state dependence”). In our setting distinguishing between these two 
explanations is crucial since only true state dependence would be conclusive on the 
existence of switching costs. In what follows we test for this causal linkage in firms’ 
repeated choices by using, within a discrete choice framework, a mixed logit model that 
allows to rule out spurious state dependence by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in 
time invariant firm-specific characteristics (Train, 2003).  
We start by assuming that the net indirect benefit firm i obtains from choosing bank 
j as its main lender at date t is given by: 
ijt ijt ijt it j j ijt W X Z             ' ' 1      (1) 
where  j,,  j and  are parameters to be estimated and ijt are random terms i.i.d. 
according to type I extreme value distribution. The deterministic part of the net benefit 
includes the following variables:  
(i)  j are bank fixed effects picking up (net) benefits originating from a specific lender 





(ii)  Zit-1 is a vector of firm characteristics including: borrower sector of economic activity 
(agriculture, industry, constructions and services), LSIZEit-1, a proxy for firm size, 
MONOit-1, a dummy variable for firms lending from a single bank. Note that the 
effect of each variable in Zit-1 on ijt varies with j;  
(iii)  Xijt denotes a set of firm-bank variables including interest rates (INTRATEijt) and 
lender-borrower physical distance (DISTij). Both regressors are expected to have a 
negative effect on ijt; DISTij is included because traditional shoe-leather costs, as 
well as other relational specific investment expenditure will all increase with it.  
(iv)  Wijt = Yijt-1 – 1 where Yijt-1 = 1{firm i chooses bank j as its main lender in t – 1} and 
1{·} is the indicator function that is equal to 1 if the condition in the brackets is 
satisfied and zero otherwise. Hence Wijt equals 0 if the previous choice of the main 
lender in confirmed and –1 otherwise so that  measures the disutility from 
switching. 
The estimation of parameters in (1) is based on the observed benefit-maximizing choices 
Yijt made by each firm. A standard maximum likelihood argument leads to a conditional 
logit model specification according to which the probability that firm i chooses bank j in 
period t as its main lender is given by (McFadden, 1974): 
  
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In this formulation Wijt captures the correlation between repeated choices so that  may 
pick up both state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity.
12 To overcome this difficulty 
and hence to identify true state dependence we assume that  is randomly distributed 
across borrowers according to a parametric density function g ( | ). Resulting choice 
probabilities are defined according to a mixed logit specification as follows: 
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where j, , j, and  are parameters to be estimated. 
Specification (2) allows to isolate the true state dependence by modeling the 
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correlation between Wijt and the error term. The expected value of  will measure only true 
state dependence while unobserved heterogeneity will be picked up by the variance of . 
This can be easily shown considering that individual parameters for Wijt can be expressed 
as i = mean + ηi where mean is the population mean and ηi is the individual stochastic 
deviation. The effect of the previous choice on the current benefit is now split in two 
additive terms: meanWijt and ηiWijt. The random part ηiWijt enters the stochastic portion of 
ijt which now equals (ηiWijt + ijt). This term is correlated over alternatives and time due 
to the common influence of ηi. With this specification the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the current error term is explicitly modeled and mean estimate is no 
longer affected by the endogeneity bias because, conditional on ηi,  Wijt is no longer 
correlated with the error term. At the same time a positive estimate of the variance of  will 
signal that switching costs are heterogeneous and/or that some unobserved heterogeneity in 
time invariant preferences is at work.  
For computational reasons the model in equation (2) is estimated separately for the 
four provincial markets (Turin, Bologna, Rome and Naples); g ( | ) is specified as a 
Lognormal distribution since we expect  to have a non-negative sign. Estimating 
parameters in (2) involves a missing data problem because INTRATEijt is observed only for 
the bank-firm relationships which are in place (including those with lenders that are not a 
main bank). To tackle this problem, we impute lending rates for unselected alternatives 
with the fitted values of INTRATEijt obtained by running a regression based on equation (3) 
(see below). This procedure introduces a generated regressor in the model and standard 
errors should be bootstrapped to correct for the variability of the first stage estimation. 
Unfortunately this is not a viable option in the context of the mixed logit specification 
given the constraints on computational resources. Hence estimated standard errors are to be 
considered as lower bounds and inference on the statistical significance of parameters has 
to be considered with that caveat in mind. Note however that the estimates we are 
interested in are so significantly different from zero that inferential conclusions seem to be 
valid even without bootstrapping standard errors (see below). 
Estimates of the relevant parameters in choice probabilities (2) are reported in 
Table 4 (coefficients for bank fixed effects and for their interactions with firm 





vary much across different provincial markets. Note first that the borrower-lender distance 
has a negative and significant effect on the probability of observing a specific bank-firm 
relationship. Borrowers whose locations are further off from those of a bank’s branches are 
less likely to choose that bank as their main lender. Coefficients on the interest rate 
variable are always negative and significantly different from zero in all provincial markets, 
consistently with a downward sloping credit demand schedule: other things being equal, a 
bank charging higher interest rates with respect to its competitors will reduce the 
probability of being chosen as the firm’s main source of credit. All in all, the observed 
matching factors used in our specification have a significant impact on the firm’s choice of 
its main banking partner.  
The estimated mean of ln () is positive and significantly different from zero in all 
the provincial markets. Having controlled for time invariant and unobservable firm 
preferences across banks, this result signals the existence of a genuine causal link between 
lender-borrower matching over time or, equivalently, the existence of switching costs in 
credit relationships. All else being equal, a borrower changing its main lender will suffer a 
disutility that is significantly greater than zero. We also checked our findings assuming that 
 is normally distributed and the results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar.  
The standard deviation of ln ( δ) is always highly significant in all provincial 
markets. As explained above this dispersion could reflect both heterogeneity of true state 
dependence across firms and the fact that some firms are better matched with a specific 
bank than other firms are (unobserved heterogeneity). Disentangling between the two 
components is beyond the scope of the present paper.
13  
4.2. Price discrimination between old and new borrowers 
Having assessed the existence of switching costs we now turn our attention to the 
impact they may have on bank competition. More precisely, we investigate whether 
switching costs are associated with bank strategies aimed at offering better conditions to 
the switching firms (see Section 2 above). The basic interest rate regression we run is the 
following:  
                                                           
13 However, it can be argued that the observed matching factors included in Vijt should control for time-
invariant matching factors in a credible manner so that the variability of δ could reflects at least in part 





ijt ijt ijt DNEW CONTROLS const INTRATE        '     (3) 
where INTRATEijt, the loan interest rate charged by bank j to firm i in period t, is regressed 
on a set of controls including market, bank, loan contract and firm characteristics, and on a 
dummy DNEWijt that equals one when bank j is firm i’s main lender in t and it was not in t 
– 1 and zero otherwise. As in the previous section, we dropped those borrowers that were 
not present in the two dates. Our interest is focused on the parameter  capturing 
differential loan conditions when a firm turns to a new main bank. Other explanatory 
variables (CONTROLS) are given by:  
(i)  lender fixed effects controlling for any bank-specific factor such as marginal cost of 
funding and bank efficiency that might have an impact on lending rates; local market 
fixed effects capturing the influence of local market conditions; 
(ii)  bank  j’s local market power as measured by its market share in the local credit 
market; 
(iii)  firm-specific variables picking up borrowers’ credit worthiness and their degree of 
informational opaqueness; they include firm size, a set of dummies indicating single-
bank firms and limited liability enterprises, sectoral fixed effects (the adopted 
classification encompasses 187 industries). Our baseline equation (3) also includes 
the composition of a firm bank debt in terms of matched and term loans shares to 
control for the possibility that lending interest rates vary with contract loan 
characteristics (maturity, collateral requirements and other technical details). 
To avoid simultaneity all time-varying regressors but DNEWijt are taken with one-year lag. 
Regression results are shown in Table 5. The estimation is carried out on the pooled data 
referring to the four provinces; moreover, in our baseline regression the sample is restricted 
to those loans offered by main banks to maintain consistency with the framework adopted 
in the discrete choice model (see equations 1 and 2). Estimated parameters for provincial, 
sectoral and bank fixed effects are not reported. Notably, they are all jointly significantly 
different from zero, denoting that idiosyncratic factors featuring individual banks and 
provinces do affect interest rates.  
In our baseline specification (column 1) the market share held by a bank within 
each provincial market has a positive effect on the cost of credit, consistently with the idea 





liability companies and firms having relationships with many banks pay lower interest 
rates probably because less risky and less opaque firms have favorable credit conditions. 
Moreover our evidence shows that firms with higher shares of matched and term loans will 
be charged lower interest rates. This could be explained by a sort of a positive sorting 
effect according to which firms using long-term and more stable sources of credit are 
expected to be less risky than the others. But the most important result is related to the 
dummy DNEWijt. All else being equal, those firms that change their main bank are offered 
a switching premium of about 44 basis points. This finding is very similar to results 
documented in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) who show that engaging a new bank 
decreases the rate paid on a new loan by more than 50 basis points. On the contrary, Black 
(2006) finds that interest rates on outside loans are around 40 basis points higher than those 
charged on loans from inside banks.  
Our findings on new-old borrower price discrimination are robust to a number of 
checks aimed at addressing the potential bias arising from omitted variables or selectivity. 
In a second specification we add to the set of explanatory variables the lender-borrower 
geographical distance that proved to shape loan price conditions (Degryse and Ongena, 
2005, Petersen and Rajan, 2002) and, at the same time, might be correlated with DNEWijt. 
Differently from other papers, it turns out that the estimated parameter for distance is never 
significantly different from zero (column 2). Thus, we do not find evidence of spatial price 
discrimination in local credit markets. All the other estimated parameters are left 
unchanged by this additional control.  
Moreover one might argue that our findings on DNEWijt are driven by the omission 
of guarantees, as far as new borrowers are requested to pledge more collateral and, at the 
same time, the latter reduce the cost of credit. Unfortunately data on collaterals are 
unavailable to us and hence we rerun regression (3) on the sub-sample of firms using only 
short term contracts (matched and revocable loans) which are typically not pledged with 
collateral (Sapienza, 2002). As shown in column 3 the new-old borrower price differential 
continues to be negative and highly significant. 
Another robustness check is concerned with selectivity bias. Interest rates are 
observed only for the main bank relationships that are actually in place. The probability of 
observing a given bank-firm matching could depend on unobserved factors that might be 





produce inconsistency in the estimated results. To tackle this potential shortcoming, a 
Heckman correction is introduced. Exploiting previous results on distance (see column 2), 
in the selection equation the probability of observing a bank-firm matching is estimated as 
a function of borrower-lender distance and the set of bank and firm characteristics used in 
the main equation. Parameters are estimated using a maximum likelihood full information 
method and results are shown in column 4. Unreported evidence on the selection equation 
shows that distance has a significant and negative effect on the probability of observing a 
bank-firm match (see also Table 4). A rho test rejects the independence between the two 
equations, showing that a selectivity bias may be an issue in our estimates. More 
importantly, selectivity does not affect the existence of a discount for firms switching to a 
new main lender. 
Up to now, we have excluded loans offered by lenders that are not a main bank. In 
column 5 we remove this constraint and assume that all customers starting a new lending 
relationship with any bank may be offered different interest rates with respect to the 
established borrowers. Accordingly DNEWijt is replaced by DNEWijt‘ that is set to one if in 
t - 1 firm i did not borrow from bank j, regardless the status of j (i.e. being j either a main 
or a non main bank, see Table 1). Results confirm our conclusions on the existence of a 
switching premium. Moreover, a comparison between the two estimated parameters in 
colums (1) and (6) clearly show that banks have to offer larger discounts if they want to 
substitute a past main lender than those that they should offer in the case they would aim at 
substituting a non main bank. Hence these findings clearly point to the importance and the 
privileged role played by the main lender.
14  
Finally, another criticism which can be raised is that the omission of firm-level 
variables correlated with the switching behavior could generate a bias in the parameter for 
DNEWijt. A straightforward solution would consist in adding borrower fixed effects to the 
specification. Unfortunately, our cross section does not allow us to perform such an 
exercise for the entire sample. However, it is possible to use firm fixed effects by 
restricting the sample to borrowers resorting to multiple lending and focusing only on 
DNEWijt‘. As shown in column 6, a new lending relationship is associated with a lower 
                                                           
14 It would have been interesting to estimate the effect of “new customer” status without a pre-existing credit 





interest rate even after controlling for any unobserved time-invariant borrower 
characteristic.  
4.3. Refinements on switching behavior and loan rates 
In the previous subsection we showed that borrowers who changed their main 
lender pay lower interest rates on their current loans. A question arises: does this discount 
depend on the mobility episode? Or may it be the case that switchers differ systematically 
from stayers in certain permanent characteristics that influence their switching behavior as 
well as the interest rates they pay and that are not controlled for? We think that the former 
interpretation is more plausible because (i) the controls included in specification (3) are 
likely to capture most of the unobserved heterogeneity and (ii) switchers are charged more 
favorable lending rates also in the regression with borrower fixed effects (see Table 5 
column 6). Nevertheless these arguments are not conclusive and some sort of confounding 
factor may be at work. To explore further this issue we adopt a counterfactual approach. 
Namely we control for unobserved borrower features by explicitly comparing interest rates 
paid by switchers with those the same borrowers would have paid if they would not be new 
client of their current bank. While the first set of prices is observed, counterfactual interest 
rates are not and have to be estimated. To this aim we follow Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010) and adopt an exact matching estimation strategy whose steps are as follows:  
(1) we split the set of firms into two subsamples: the switchers (group T) and the stayers 
(group C); 
(2) for each firm i  T we construct a control group C(i) made of all firms belonging to C 
that are similar to firm i. A firm is considered similar to i if, in the period t, borrows from 
the same main bank of firm i and matches the same characteristics of i (e.g. size, sector of 
economic activity, etc.). For continuous firm characteristics (say, size) a firm is included in 
C(i) if its size belongs to a (-20%, +20%) window of firm i size while for qualitative firm 
characteristics the matching is obvious. The matching schedule varies according to the 
number of characteristics required. A firm c  C may belong to more than one control 
group, that is it may happen that c  C(i) and c  C(j) for i  j and i, j  T (matching with 
replacement). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
a firm could be present in the second period and not in the first one only because of a threshold effect (see 





(3) for all i  T we take the spreads between the interest rate charged to firm i and those 
paid by firms belonging to C(i); 
(4) we finally regress the spreads on a constant and cluster errors at switcher level.  
The results of this procedure are reported in Table 6 where each column 
corresponds to a different matching scheme. For example, matching on bank, province, 
sector of economic activity and size (column 1) leaves 918,797 observations and 5,481 
switchers, implying that for each switcher there are on average 168 similar stayers. 
Spreads vary between – 12** and – 58*** basis points and they are significantly less than 
zero regardless of the matching schedule. Notably, in the last column, in which matching 
variables are the same as those used in the regression (3) (except for a less fine sectoral 
breakdown), a switcher receives a discount equal to 42*** basis points that is very similar 
to the result shown in Table 5 column 1.  
5. Discussion 
The econometric evidence collected so far leads to two main conclusions. 
Switching to a new main lender is costly in terms of a one-shot reduction of the indirect 
utility associated to the lending relationship. Moreover, banks price discriminate between 
old and new borrowers by offering a discount to the switchers. These findings are 
consistent with the tenets of switching costs models with customer recognition illustrated 
in Section 2. However, one could argue that the same evidence can be accommodated by 
models that do not explicitly assume the existence of switching costs and whose 
predictions are observational equivalent to them.  
For instance, with Bertrand competition banks may reduce interest rates to attract 
more customers and this kind of strategy is not motivated by attached customers’ lock-in. 
In this perspective, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000; henceforth FT) present a model of 
behavior based price discrimination whose predictions are fully consistent with our 
empirical results on the insider-outsider interest rate difference. In their model of duopoly 
with horizontal differentiation, short-term contracts and time-invariance of consumers’ 
brand preferences, FT show that firms offer second period discounts to customers attached 
to their opponent in the first period. Moreover, a share of customers will switch supplier.
15  
                                                           
15 In FT original model the authors consider a Hotelling model with two firms located at the extremes of the 
unit line and a population of consumers that are distributed along the line according to a cumulative 





Though similar in terms of predictions on price discrimination, the two models 
radically differ in the mechanisms triggering these results. Specifically, in switching costs 
models lending history is relevant because through the presence of exogenous switching 
costs borrowers will be ex post locked into the past relationship. Competing banks may 
have an incentive to lower prices in order to tease these rival’s attached borrowers. In FT, 
there are no switching costs but borrowers’ preferences are differentiated across banks. 
Thus, lending history matters because it reveals the intensity of borrowers’ preferences 
across banks and in doing so signals which customers may be the target for rival banks’ 
poaching strategies.  
An empirical test that can discriminate between the two alternative explanations is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. However it is possible to argue that FT’s model can 
hardly substitute for an explanation of our empirical evidence based on switching costs. In 
fact, although FT’s predictions are consistent with the results stemming from the interest 
rate equation, they do not come up with our findings on inertia in lending relationships. In 
FT model consumer choices are positively correlated across time because preferences are 
invariant from one period to another. Once their time invariant nature is controlled for as in 
our mixed logit specification, there should be no reason for the past decisions to influence 
the current ones. Summing up, switching costs are able to explain the additional evidence 
on inertia that instead can be hardly accommodated within a model of horizontal product 
differentiation like that proposed by FT.  
Inertia and interest rate discrimination across borrowers can also be predicted 
within adverse selection models. Apart from switching costs, borrowers may also differ in 
terms of the quality of their investment projects (see Section 2). Specifically assume that 
there are two types of firms: those having investment projects with an high probability of 
success G and those holding investment projects with a lower probability of success B 
(obviously,  G > B). Switching costs are assumed to be zero. Thanks to its past 
relationship with the borrower, bank I is assumed to observe a signal about firms quality 
whose knowledge is not available to the outsider. Accordingly, the insider will bid 
aggressively for borrowers that are considered of good quality according to its signal, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
over the two alternatives are time invariant and there are no switching costs in moving across these 
alternatives. In the second period, firms are able to recognize the customers they served in the past and can 





while it will be less aggressive in bidding for bad quality firms. As a consequence, the O 
bank will be jeopardized in its ability to compete for borrowers as it has to face the risk of 
lending mostly to bad quality firms. The threat of adverse selection will reverberate on 
outsider pricing strategies and may limit the intensity of price competition. 
These are the basic elements of second period Sharpe (1990)’s equilibrium model 
as emended by von Thadden (2004). A clear cut prediction from it is that borrowers’ lock-
in will increase with the severity of adverse selection. But what are model insights as far as 
the interest rates charged by bank I and O are concerned? Black (2008) recently shows that 
interest rates charged to firms that borrow from bank I may be higher or lower than those 
charged to firms that borrow from bank O in Sharpe-von Thadden model, depending on the 
values taken on by model parameters.
16 In particular, it is shown that when the difference 
between G and B is large, expected interest rates paid by borrowers switching to the bank 
O will be higher than those charged by the bank I to its loyal borrowers. The opposite 
holds true when parameter space is such that the difference between G and B is relatively 
small. Moreover, Ogura (2006) emphasizes that predictions from adverse selection models 
in terms of interest rate difference between insider and outsider banks are very sensitive to 
the way with which the rules of the bidding game are designed. In particular, he shows that 
when the bidding game between bank I and O is an English auction, switchers will pay 
higher interest rates than those charged by the I bank to the stayers. This uncertainty about 
theoretical outcomes is also reflected by recent empirical findings on this topic. 
The ambiguous predictions on price discrimination obtained from adverse selection 
models make very difficult to compare them with those deriving from switching cost 
literature. Here, we circumvent this difficulty by proposing two tests that can shed some 
light on that issue. First, following Black (2006), we restrict our interest rate regression to 
small firms. In fact, the variance of ’s should be maximum within this size category.
17 
Thus, according to Sharpe-von Thadden model, it should be more likely that switchers pay 
higher interest rates than those charged to borrowers that do not change their banking 
partner. This exercise leads to an estimate of the parameter of DNEWijt equal to -0.623*** 
(standard error = 0.054), thereby showing that new-old borrowers interest rate difference is 
                                                           
16 Black (2008) also show bank I interest rates are higher than those charged by bank O for given borrower 
type. 





still negative for the small firms sample and is even larger than that found for the whole 
sample. Thus we found evidence in favor of poaching strategies followed by the O banks 
even in the circumstance in which it should be more likely to observe the opposite 
according to the tenets of the adverse selection models. Accordingly, we conclude that our 
evidence on interest rate discrimination fits better a model with heterogeneous switching 
costs and customer recognition. Interestingly, this result may also indicate that switching 
costs are higher in the case of small businesses which on average take higher advantage 
from relationship lending and are more likely to have a single bank partner (that implies 
higher transaction and learning costs).  
Our second test is aimed at comparing interest rates set by I and O banks when the 
intensity of adverse selection is at a minimum. This enables us to observe price 
discrimination in a setting where the potential role of adverse selection is strongly limited. 
This situation may occur when a borrower switch to a new main lender with which the 
borrower already had a lending relationship in the previous period. In fact adverse 
selection is likely to manifest itself more intensively when a completely new relationship 
with a bank has started. At the same time, as already explained, we could expect that some 
kind of switching costs will be generated even when switching occurred toward an already 
known bank. Hence we rerun regression (3) on the subsample of multiple-bank firms that 
either do not switch or switch to an already known bank. “Paying customers to switch” 
strategies are again confirmed by this additional evidence: the parameter for DNEWijt 
equals -0.171*** with a standard error of 0.035. Interestingly, the estimated switching 
premium is negative and can be consistent with our interpretation that a change in the main 
lender can generate switching costs even if that bank was among the firm’s creditors in 
period t - 1. Moreover, the estimated discount is much lower than that observed for the 
sample including also the switching to a completely new main lender (see table 5, column 
1). This is consistent with the fact that in this case switching costs also include the costs to 
start a completely new lending relationship.
18 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
                                                           
18 Interestingly, according to unreported evidence estimated switching costs (according to the procedure 
illustrated in Subsection 4.1) are significantly greater than zero (but with a lower magnitude) also in the case 





This paper investigates the issue of switching costs in lending markets where they 
are expected to be relevant because of the complexity of bank-firm contracts and the 
asymmetries of information between inside and outside banks. Using bank-firm matched 
data on Italian local credit markets we identify two basic facts that have important 
consequences for that environment. First, through a mixed logit model we show that firms 
tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. Since this finding is not related to 
unobserved and time invariant firms’ preferences across banks it signals the existence of 
switching costs: turning to a new bank is costly in terms of a one-shot reduction of the 
indirect benefit a firm receives from its lending relationship. Second, it turns out that banks 
offer lower interest rates to their new customers to cover part of these costs, consistently 
with the tenets of literature on switching costs with customer recognition. The magnitude 
of that discount is non-negligible: on average it amounts to about 44 basis points and is 
equal to 7 percent of the average interest rate.  
In general, our results put emphasis on the relevance of switching costs for the 
analysis of bank-firm relationships and competition in credit markets. Moreover, they call 
for a stronger integration between the traditional topics of the banking literature like 
adverse selection, moral hazard and asymmetric information and those typical of 
theoretical and empirical contributions dealing with switching costs in the Industrial 






Table 1 – Variables definition 
Variable  Definition 
Firm varying 
Sector of economic 
activity 
187 sectors belonging to agriculture, industry, constructions and services and broadly 
corresponding to the three digits ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities) classification 
LSIZEit  Natural logarithm of the sum of loans extended to firm i in period t. The sum is over all the 
bank-firm relationships recorded in the Survey on lending rates and regarding firm i  
DLTDit  Dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a limited liability company in period t and zero 
otherwise 
MONOit  Dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a single-bank borrower in period t and zero 
otherwise 
SHMit  Share of matched loans in firm i’s bank debt portfolio in period t 
SHTit  Share of term loans in firm i’s bank debt portfolio in period t 
Firm-bank varying 
INTRATEijt  Loan interest rate charged by bank j to firm i in period t. It is computed as a weighted 
average of interest rates charged on matched, term and revocable loans 
MSjp(i)t  Bank j’s loan market share in period t in the province p(i) where firm i is located 
Yijt  It is set equal to 1 if firm i chooses bank j as its main lender in t and zero otherwise. Formally 
Yijt = 1{firm i chooses bank j as its main lender in t} and 1{·} is the indicator function that is 
equal to 1 if the condition in the brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise 
DNEWijt  Dummy variable equal to one when bank j is firm i’s main lender in t and it was not in t – 1 
and zero otherwise. It holds that DNEWijt = Yijt (1 - Yijt-1) 
DNEWijt‘  Dummy variable equal to one when bank j is one of firm i’s lenders in t and it was not in t – 
1 and zero otherwise 
DISTij  Physical distance between firm i and bank j. It has been computed as kilometers between the 
municipality where the firm is located and the municipality where the bank has the nearest 
branch to that firm. For some bank-firm relationship distance is zero because the bank has at 
least one branch in the municipality where the firm’s headquarter is located. To circumvent 
this problem we substitute zeros with the ray of the circumference with the same area of that 
of the municipality. It is equivalent to approximate the municipality surface with a 
circumference and to assume that branches are located in the centre of the circumference 
while firms are uniformly distributed on the boundaries. This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption since branches are usually located where the population density is higher while 
firms are generally located far from cities centers. With such a substitution it may happen 
that the distance within a municipality is greater than some of the distance between 
municipalities. In this case we pick up the minimum of the two distances 
Wijt  It is equal to zero if in t – 1 bank j is firm i’s main lender and – 1 otherwise. It holds that Wijt 






Table 2 – Main local market characteristics 
  Turin  Bologna  Rome  Naples 
Per capita real GDP (000 euros) - 2002  19.7  22.2  20.1  10.6 
Value added composition (percent.) - 2003         
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and  fishing  0.8 1.5 0.5 1.2 
Manufacturing 24.7  25.6  8.2  12.2 
Construction  4.6 4.3 4.3 5.2 
Services  69.9 68.7 86.9 81.4 
      
Market size (loans extended to firms, 
millions euros) – December 2003  22,649 16,018 64,521 11,184 
Herfindhal index on loans  0.0605  0.0582  0.0352  0.0595 
Social capital (# bags of blood donated 
per million inhabitants in 1995)  38.9 75.7 17.2  9.0 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable No.  of  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
   
 Turin 
Interest rate [INTRATE] – only main 
bank 14562 5.993 2.117 0.000  13.744
Interest rate [INTRATE] – all bank-
firm relationships  23964 6.105 2.176 0.000  19.127
Size [LSIZE] 14562 11.944 1.525 0.000  20.169
Share of matched loans [SHM] 14562 0.229 0.323 0.000  1.000
Share of term loans [SHT] 14562 0.466 0.417 0.000  1.000
Single-bank borrower [MONO] 14562 0.650 0.477 0.000  1.000
Limited liability borrower [DLTD] 14562 0.429 0.495 0.000  1.000
New main relationship [DNEW] 14562 0.122 0.328 0.000  1.000
New relationship [DNEW’]  23964 0.078 0.268 0.000 1.000
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
main relationship  14562 5.154 3.245 0.706 65.567
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
all relationships  218430 7.755 6.757 0.706 76.338
Market share [MS] 15 0.045 0.044 0.011  0.150
   
 Bologna 
Interest rate [INTRATE] – only main 
bank 10466 4.765 1.555 0.842  15.660
Interest rate [INTRATE] – all bank-
firm relationships  17791 4.866 1.644 0.842  15.660
Size [LSIZE] 10466 12.036 1.578 0.000  19.658
Share of matched loans [SHM] 10466 0.269 0.339 0.000  1.000
Share of term loans [SHT] 10466 0.471 0.410 0.000  1.000
Single-bank borrower [MONO] 10466 0.607 0.488 0.000  1.000
Limited liability borrower [DLTD] 10466 0.472 0.499 0.000  1.000
New main relationship [DNEW] 10466 0.129 0.335 0.000  1.000
New relationship [DNEW’]  17791 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
main relationship  10466 5.355 2.311 1.395 45.522
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
all relationships  156990 8.281 6.191 1.395 51.610





Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the sample (continued) 
Variable No.  of  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
   
 Rome 
Interest rate [INTRATE] – only main 
bank 16014 6.683 2.494 0.002  19.520
Interest rate [INTRATE] – all bank-
firm relationships  23351 6.945 2.526 0.000  19.520
Size [LSIZE] 16014 12.064 1.721 0.000  20.968
Share of matched loans [SHM] 16014 0.159 0.287 0.000  1.000
Share of term loans [SHT] 16014 0.458 0.442 0.000  1.000
Single-bank borrower [MONO] 16014 0.702 0.458 0.000  1.000
Limited liability borrower [DLTD] 16014 0.646 0.478 0.000  1.000
New main relationship [DNEW] 16014 0.090 0.286 0.000  1.000
New relationship [DNEW’]  23351 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
main relationship  16014 3.987 7.227 0.003 60.497
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
all relationships  240210 8.529 10.136 0.003 60.497
Market share [MS] 15 0.031 0.029 0.005  0.100
   
 Naples 
Interest rate [INTRATE] – only main 
bank 8289 6.802 2.473 0.861  16.601
Interest rate [INTRATE] – all bank-
firm relationships  13792 7.041 2.532 0.743  18.226
Size [LSIZE] 8289 12.035 1.635 0.693  18.276
Share of matched loans [SHM] 8289 0.185 0.298 0.000  1.000
Share of term loans [SHT] 8289 0.416 0.425 0.000  1.000
Single-bank borrower [MONO] 8289 0.648 0.478 0.000  1.000
Limited liability borrower [DLTD] 8289 0.559 0.497 0.000  1.000
New main relationship [DNEW] 8289 0.126 0.332 0.000  1.000
New relationship [DNEW’]  13792 0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
main relationship  8289 15.333 52.910 0.718 392.437
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
all relationships  124335 41.944 98.982 0.524 399.448
Market share [MS] 15 0.047 0.040 0.014  0.147
   
 Entire  sample 
Interest rate [INTRATE] – only main 
bank 49331 6.093 2.336 0.000  19.520
Interest rate [INTRATE] – all bank-
firm relationships  78898 6.238 2.397 0.000  19.520
Size [LSIZE] 49331 12.018 1.621 0.000  20.968
Share of matched loans [SHM] 49331 0.207 0.314 0.000  1.000
Share of term loans [SHT] 49331 0.456 0.426 0.000  1.000
Single-bank borrower [MONO] 49331 0.657 0.475 0.000  1.000
Limited liability borrower [DLTD] 49331 0.530 0.499 0.000  1.000
New main relationship [DNEW] 49331 0.114 0.318 0.000  1.000
New relationship [DNEW’]  78898 0.076 0.265 0.000 1.000
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 
main relationships  49331 6.528 22.528 0.003 392.437
Lender-borrower distance [DIST] - 





Table 4 – Mixed logit model 
The table reports maximum likelihood estimates for the model defined in equation (2). The dependent 
variable is the probability that in period t (March 2005) firm i chooses bank j as its main lender. INTRATE is 
the interest rate charged by bank j to firm i in period t (March 2005). DIST is the physical distance between 
firm i and bank j. W is variable equal to zero if in t – 1 (March 2004) bank j is firm i’s main lender and – 1 
otherwise. All specifications include (unreported) bank-fixed effects interacted with firm characteristics 
including four dummies for the sector of economic activity (agriculture, industry, constructions and services), 
firm size proxied by the natural logarithm of the sum of loans extended by all banks to firm i in period t – 1 
(March 2004) (LSIZE) and a dummy variable for single-bank firms (MONO). The symbol * indicates the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent; *** at 1 percent.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Turin  Bologna  Rome  Naples 
Interest rate  - 0.667***  - 0.504***  - 0.510***  - 0.662*** 
[INTRATE]  (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019) 
Distance  - 0.078***  - 0.179***  - 0.038***  - 0.045*** 
[DIST]  (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) 
W      
Mean of ln()  1.961*** 1.928*** 2.143*** 2.018*** 
  (0.052) (0.082) (0.082) (0.075) 
Std. dev. of ln()  0.886*** 0.892*** 0.808*** 0.918*** 
  (0.060) (0.097) (0.077) (0.085) 
Bank  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES 
Log Likelihood  - 8,689  - 6,940  - 8,153  - 5,341 
Likelihood  ratio  index  0.780 0.755 0.812 0.762 
Observations  14,562 10,468 16,020 8,289 







Table 5 - Interest rate regression 
The table reports OLS estimates for the model defined in equation (3). The dependent variable INTRATE is 
the interest rate charged by bank j to firm i in period t (March 2005). MS is the loan market share of bank j in 
the province where firm i is located. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of loans extended by all banks 
to firm i in period t – 1 (March 2004). SHM is the share of matched loans in firm i’s bank debt portfolio in 
period t – 1 (March 2004). SHT is the share of term loans in firm i’s bank debt portfolio in t – 1. MONO is a 
dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a single-bank borrower in t – 1 and zero otherwise. DLTD is a 
dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a limited liability company in t - 1 and zero otherwise. DNEW is a 
dummy variable equal to one when bank j is firm i’s main lender in t and it was not in t – 1 and zero 
otherwise. DIST is the physical distance between firm i and bank j. DNEW‘ is a dummy variable equal to one 
when bank j is one of firm i’s lenders in t and it was not in t – 1 and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The symbol * indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10 percent level; ** at 5 percent; *** at 1 percent.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  baseline distance short  term  heckman  new  all 
relat. 
firm FE 
Provincial  market  share  2.371*** 2.405*** 3.361*** 2.271*** 1.514*** -0.210 
[MS]  (0.489) (0.510) (1.034) (0.478) (0.383) (0.531) 
Firm  size  -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.087*** -0.117*** -0.126***  
[LSIZE]  (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)  
Share of matched loans  -1.274***  -1.274*** -1.205*** -1.274*** -1.474***  
[SHM]  (0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.034) (0.031)  
Share  of  term  loans  -3.010*** -3.010***   -3.010*** -2.801***  
[STM]  (0.029) (0.029)   (0.025) (0.026)  
Single-bank  firm  0.162*** 0.162*** 0.252*** 0.164*** -0.202***   
[MONO = 1]  (0.023) (0.023) (0.043) (0.022) (0.019)  
Limited  liability  firm  -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.391*** -0.232*** -0.237***  
[DLTD = 1]  (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) (0.016)  
New  main  relationship -0.438*** -0.438*** -0.363*** -0.339***    
[DNEW = 1]  (0.031) (0.031) (0.057) (0.131)    
Lender-borrower  dist.   0.001      
[DIST]   (0.002)      
New  relationship      -0.287***  -0.384*** 
[DNEW’ = 1]      (0.031)  (0.044) 
R h o      - 0 . 0 2 3     
     (0.030)    
Prob  (Rho  =  0)     0.0450    
Province  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm  fixed  effects  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Bank  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  9.235*** 9.231*** 9.344*** 9.308*** 9.691*** 6.494*** 
  (0.117) (0.119) (0.198) (0.113) (0.095) (0.060) 
Observations  49331 49331 15560 739965  78898 43947 
R-squared  0.41 0.41 0.31   0.34 0.68 





Table 6 - Difference between interest rates charged on new borrowers and rates on attached firms 
The table reports OLS estimates for the regression described in the subsection 4.3. The dependent variable is 
the spread between the interest rate charged to a switcher and the rates charged by the same bank to all 
stayers that are similar to the switcher. Similarity is based on the matching variables. Spreads are regressed 
on a constant. Robust standard errors, clustered at switcher level, are reported in parentheses. The symbol * 
indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent; *** at 1 
percent.  
Matching  variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lender    YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector of economic 
activity  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm  size  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Single  bank  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
Limited  liability  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES 
Share of term loans  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Share of matched loans  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Spread -0.121**  -0.314***  -0.292*** -0.578*** -0.244*** -0.416*** 
  (0.049) (0.054) (0.058) (0.080) (0.096) (0.118) 
Observations  918,797  363,560  213,912  49,737 68,376 22,600 
Number of switchers  5,481 5,343 5,183 3,929 4,120 2,597 
Average number of 
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